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PROTECTING THE VICTIMS OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW, WITH A VIEW TOWARDS AMENDING THE CDA
230 SAFE HARBOR

By: William Wells1

“It has become appallingly obvious that our technology has exceeded our humanity.”
Albert Einstein
This century old quote, spoken by the great inventor in reference to the atomic bomb age,
tends to resonate loudly after a simple perusal of today’s Internet. The Internet, a tool of such
immense value, can and oftentimes does; reveal the very depth of human depravity. Nowhere is
this depravation more exemplified than in the ever-expanding world of Internet child
pornography. Despite its egregious nature, Internet child pornography continues to flourish, due
to the difficulty of regulation in a technologically evolving medium and a disjointed regulatory
scheme. Most shockingly, is the shelter provided to Internet service providers (“ISPs”), who

1

The impetus for this paper was established during my time at the Ocean County, NJ Prosecutor’s Office. While
there, I worked in child sex crimes, where the gross injustice of the current state of child pornography laws came
to light. This paper will explore the current state of those laws, with a view towards holding Internet Service
Providers liable when they turn a blind eye to child pornography hosted or transmitted on their services.

escape liability arising out of the harm caused by child pornography hosted by or transmitted
through their services.
The purpose of this paper is to further explore the relationship between child
pornography, the Internet, and the ISPs, with an overarching focus on bringing closure to the
victims of Internet hosted child pornography. More specifically, in Part I, this paper will focus
on clarifying the murkiness surrounding child pornography and the Internet; Part II, will examine
the pre-existing law and its effectiveness in helping victims of child pornography hold negligent
ISPs responsible for knowingly hosting illegal material; and Part III, will argue that similar to
Copyright Law, the safe harbor provision of Section 230 (“§ 230”) of the Communications
Decency Act (“CDA”), should be amended to hold ISPs accountable when they have actual
knowledge that one of their websites is hosting child pornography.
PART I. THE STATE OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY IN A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
WORLD
a. RELEVANT DEFINITIONS
Traditional Child Pornography
Defining child pornography is not black and white. Audiovisual works, depicting real
children engaged in sexual acts, is unambiguous and self-identifying.2 Yet on the other end of the
spectrum, still photographs of fully or mostly clothed teenagers who are posed in stances or
contexts that strike some observers as sexualized may or may not constitute child pornography. 3
For the purpose of this paper, the term traditional child pornography includes this full range of
examples, from the most egregious to the relatively benign.
2

See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1998) (referring to audiovisual works depicting real prepubescent children
clearly engaged in sexual acts).
3
Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography, 91 Or. L. Rev. 1, 40 (2012).

2

Self-Produced Child Pornography
In addition to traditional child pornography this paper, at times, will distinguish the
relatively new concept of self-produced child pornography or underage sexting from traditional
child pornography.4 Loosely defined, self-produced child pornography is the modern term given
to “the practice of sending or posting sexually suggestive text messages and images, including
nude or semi-nude photographs, via cellular phone or over the Internet.”5 Naturally, to qualify as
self-produced child pornography, the actor must be under the age of eighteen.6
ISPs
ISPs, as “gatekeepers to the Internet,” play an integral role in this paper. 7 By definition,
an ISP is a business or corporation that provides users access to the Internet.8 Similarly, included
categorically under the heading of ISP for the purpose of this paper, are online service providers
(“OSPs”).9

Under Federal Law, ISPs and OSPs are given a broad definition and include any

entity who “transmits, routs or provides connections for online communications,” or “provides
online services and/or network access” to Internet users.10
b. THE HARMS OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

4

See infra p. 8, (Arguing that victims of self-produced child pornography are copyright holders.).
JoAnne Sweeny, Do Sexting Prosecutions Violate Teenagers’ Constitutional Rights?, 48 San Diego L. Rev. 951, 952
(2011) (defining sexting).
6
18 U.S.C. § 2256
7
(The phrase, “gatekeepers to the Internet,” has been coined by the author to capture the unique position
occupied by ISPs in the world of the Internet.).
8
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_service_provider (last visited Dec. 2 2013).
9
See Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_service_provider (last visited Dec. 2, 2013) (noting that OSPs
can be an ISP, email provider, news provider (press), entertainment provider (music, movies), search, e-shopping
site (online stores), e-finance or e-banking site, e-health site, e-government site, etc.).
10
17 U.S.C. § 512 (k)(1)
5
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The harm inherent in traditional child pornography has been well articulated by
Congress, but bears repeating.11 Similarly, The United States Supreme Court has highlighted the
harm child pornography inflicts on its victims and the repeated exacerbation of this harm that
occurs when the pornography is circulated.12
What is not well articulated is the harm caused by self-produced child pornography. It is
quite clear that the same depth of research does not exist for child sexting as it does for
traditional child pornography.13 Often, this lack of comprehensive research leads to a wrongful
focus on the lack of physical harm to the child in the production of a sext. In fact, some
commentators argue that the harm of creating traditional child pornography through sexual abuse
far outweighs the harm, if any, associated with voluntary self-production of child pornography.14

11

See 18 U.S.C. § 2251, Sexual Exploitation of Children, The findings were:
(1) the use of children in the production of sexually explicit material, including photographs, films, videos,
computer images, and other visual depictions, is a form of sexual abuse which can result in physical or
psychological harm, or both, to the children involved;
(2) where children are used in its production, child pornography permanently records the victim's abuse,
and its continued existence causes the child victims of sexual abuse continuing harm by haunting those
children in future years;
(3) child pornography is often used as part of a method of seducing other children into sexual activity; a
child who is reluctant to engage in sexual activity with an adult, or to pose for sexually explicit
photographs, can sometimes be convinced by viewing depictions of other children “having fun”
participating in such activity;
(4) child pornography is often used by pedophiles and child sexual abusers to stimulate and whet their
own sexual appetites, and as a model for sexual acting out with children; such use of child pornography
can desensitize the viewer to the pathology of sexual abuse or exploitation of children, so that it can
become acceptable to and even preferred by the viewer;
(5) new photographic and computer imaging technologies make it possible to produce by electronic,
mechanical, or other means, visual depictions of what appear to be children engaging in sexually explicit
conduct that are virtually indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer from unretouched photographic
images of actual children engaging in sexually explicit conduct…; And see infra, note 22.
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See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 (noting that “the materials produced [child pornography] are a permanent record of
the children’s participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation”).
13
Susan H. Duncan, A Legal Response Is Necessary For Self-Produced Child Pornography: A Legislator’s Checklist For
Drafting The Bill, 89 Or. L. Rev. 645, 654-663 (2010).
14
Id.

4

This comparison of the physical harm of self-produced child pornography and traditional
child pornography is wrong because it does not account for the mental harms that often
accompany an ill-advised ‘sext.’15 The permanent mental harm caused by sexting is exemplified
by the tragic story of Jessica Logan, an eighteen year old who committed suicide after she sent a
nude picture of herself to her boyfriend that was later spread throughout her Cincinnati-area high
school.16

Commenting on the mental abuse Jessica suffered, MSNBC.COM reported, “[t]he

girls were harassing her, calling her a slut and a whore. She was miserable and depressed, afraid
even to go to school.”17
c. THE PREVALENCE OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
It is difficult to ascertain, with any degree of certainty, a consistent estimation regarding
the amount of traditional child pornography available throughout the world. For instance, in
1996, one commentator noted that there was a vast, worldwide, commercial five billion dollar
child pornography industry.18 Other estimations place child pornography as a one billion dollar
industry, exploiting about 1.5 million children.19 Yet there are others who inexplicably deny the
existence of commercial child pornography in the United States. 20 If we disregard the seemingly
absurd contention of those who deny the existence of child pornography, and adopt a

15

See Id. at 658 (noting readily identifiable harms from self-produced child pornography, [which] include: “mental
anguish, harassment, economic harm, and social stigma”).
16
Clay Calvert, Sex Cell Phones, Privacy, And The First Amendment: When Children Become Child Pornographers
And The Lolita Effect Undermines The Law, 18 CommLaw Conspectus 1, 3 (2009).
17
Id.
18
Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 209, 232 (2001).
19
Id.
20
Id.
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conservative estimate of the prevalence of child pornography, the numbers and prevalence
remain alarming.21
Estimates regarding the prevalence of underage sexting are also hard to obtain. In a 2009
Associated Press-MTV poll, more than a quarter of the 1247 participants (ages fourteen to
twenty-four) surveyed had been involved in some type of “naked sexting.” 22

Critics may

disregard the results of this survey because the participants did not constitute a random sampling
of society, nor were they all underage. Regardless of this criticism, it’s apparent that although
not rising to epidemic levels, underage sexting is common.
d. THE INTERNET’S PROLIFERATION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
The Internet has had a major impact on child pornography. By the mid 1980’s, circulation
of child pornography in the United States had waned drastically. 23 Since the advent of the
Internet, what was once almost domestically obsolete has been dramatically spread and
exploited.

As Congress recognized, with ever-increasing technological capability at their

fingertips, including peer-to-peer file sharing and encrypted IP addresses, pedophiles can stay
one step ahead of law enforcement experts as they peddle child pornography.24 It is safe to say,

21

See e.g. New York Daily News, http://www.nydailynews.com/2.1353/child-porn-pervasive-catching-offendersshooting-fish-barrel-article-1.380910 (last visited Dec. 2, 2013) (comparing the catching of online child
pornography users to “catching fish in a barrel”).
22
Duncan, supra note 11, at 652.
23
Adler, supra note 18, at 231.
24
See 18 U.S.C. 2251, Sexual Exploitation of Children, Additional findings were:
(6) computers and computer imaging technology can be used to -(A) alter sexually explicit photographs, films, and videos in such a way as to make it virtually
impossible for unsuspecting viewers to identify individuals, or to determine if the offending
material was produced using children;
(B) produce visual depictions of child sexual activity designed to satisfy the preferences of
individual child molesters, pedophiles, and pornography collectors; and
(C) alter innocent pictures of children to create visual depictions of those children engaging in
sexual conduct;

6

that as the technological world has advanced to the twenty-first century, we have now entered
“the golden age of child pornography.”25
PART II: AN EXAMINATION OF THE PRE-EXISTING LAW AND ITS
EFFECTIVENESS IN HELPING VICTIMS OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY HOLD
NEGLIGENT ISPS RESPONSIBLE FOR KNOWINGLY HOSTING ILLEGAL
MATERIAL
a. COPYRIGHT LAW
(7) the creation or distribution of child pornography which includes an image of a recognizable minor
invades the child's privacy and reputational interests, since images that are created showing a child's face
or other identifiable feature on a body engaging in sexually explicit conduct can haunt the minor for years
to come;
(8) the effect of visual depictions of child sexual activity on a child molester or pedophile using that
material to stimulate or whet his own sexual appetites, or on a child where the material is being used as a
means of seducing or breaking down the child's inhibitions to sexual abuse or exploitation, is the same
whether the child pornography consists of photographic depictions of actual children or visual depictions
produced wholly or in part by electronic, mechanical, or other means, including by computer, which are
virtually indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer from photographic images of actual children;
(9) the danger to children who are seduced and molested with the aid of child sex pictures is just as great
when the child pornographer or child molester uses visual depictions of child sexual activity produced
wholly or in part by electronic, mechanical, or other means, including by computer, as when the material
consists of unretouched photographic images of actual children engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(10)
(A) the existence of and traffic in child pornographic images creates the potential for many types
of harm in the community and presents a clear and present danger to all children; and
(B) it inflames the desires of child molesters, pedophiles, and child pornographers who prey on
children, thereby increasing the creation and distribution of child pornography and the sexual
abuse and exploitation of actual children who are victimized as a result of the existence and use
of these materials;
(11)
(A) the sexualization and eroticization of minors through any form of child pornographic images
has a deleterious effect on all children by encouraging a societal perception of children as sexual
objects and leading to further sexual abuse and exploitation of them; and
(B) this sexualization of minors creates an unwholesome environment which affects the
psychological, mental and emotional development of children and undermines the efforts of
parents and families to encourage the sound mental, moral and emotional development of
children;
(12) prohibiting the possession and viewing of child pornography will encourage the possessors of such
material to rid themselves of or destroy the material, thereby helping to protect the victims of child
pornography and to eliminate the market for the sexual exploitative use of children; and
(13) the elimination of child pornography and the protection of children from sexual exploitation provide
a compelling governmental interest for prohibiting the production, distribution, possession, sale, or
viewing of visual depictions of children engaging in sexually explicit conduct, including both photographic
images of actual children engaging in such conduct and depictions produced by computer or other means
which are virtually indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer from photographic images of actual
children engaging in such conduct.; And see supra, note 9.
25

Adler, supra note 18, at 231.
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In certain situations, copyright law may afford victims of child pornography civil redress
against ISPS. As way of background, at the most basic level, it is well understood that to qualify
for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author.26 Original, as the term is used in
copyright, means only that the work is independently created by the author (as opposed to copied
from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. 27 The level of
creativity required is extremely low, and work satisfies that requirement as long as it possesses
some creative spark, no matter how crude, humble or obvious it might be.28
Historically, Congress’ power to enact copyright laws is found in the Intellectual
Property Clause of the United States Constitution, which authorizes Congress to “secur[e] for
limited times to authors and inventors… the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries.”29 Although the original goal of the clause was to protect the progress of science,
the protections have been expanded and applied to the arts, including photography and
videography.30
A repeated victim of evolution, copyright law has long struggled to stay abreast of
perpetually modernizing technology, which over time has made copyright infringement easy and
commonplace.31 Nowhere is this struggle more evident than in the provisions of Title 17 of the
United States Code (“Title 17”), colloquially known as the Copyright Law of 1976.32
Particularly demonstrative of this inability to adapt to technology is the Digital Millennium

26

Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
Id.
28
Id.
29
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
30
Id.
31
See Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copyright_law_of_the_United_States (last visited Dec. 2, 2013)
(noting the multiple instances of updated Copyright Law in the United States).
32
See Copyright Law of the United States, http://www.copyright.gov/title17/circ92.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2013)
(demonstrating the extent of the Copyright Law of 1976).
27
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Copyright Act (“DMCA”), adopted as part of Title 17 in 1998. 33 The DMCA was promulgated
in an attempt to keep pace with the Internet, “a technology that made copying and disseminating
works around the world incredibly easy, on a scale previously unimaginable.”34 In assessing the
effectiveness of copyright law as a tool of civil redress against ISPs, we need to examine the
DMCA’s most impactful provision, 17 USC § 512, which applies to virtually all commercial
websites [ISPs] in the U.S. dealing with third-party content.35
The Profound Impact Of OCILLA’s Nuanced Safe Harbors
The Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (“OCILLA”), 17 U.S.C. §
512, provides four mutually exclusive safe harbors, insulating ISPs from liability in certain
copyright infringement actions.36 The impetus for establishing OCILLA was provided by the
powerful ISPs who were concerned about their potential liability in the constantly fluctuating
legal world of online copyright infringement.37 The ISPs were bolstered by the Legislature, who
feared that in the absence of clear legislation, ISPs who faced the possibility of primary or
secondary liability in infringement actions would be hesitant to invest in Internet services and
technologies.38
Eligibility under OCILLA
At the outset, to be eligible for one of OCILLA’s four specified safe harbors, ISPs must
adopt and reasonably implement a policy that addresses and terminates the accounts of repeat
33

See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf (last visited
Dec. 2, 2013) (outlining the varying provisions of the DMCA).
34
Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 Colum. J. L. & Arts 233, 233 (2009).
35
See Id. (noting that virtually every ISP including, “Amazon, AOL, CNN, eBay, Facebook, Google, MySpace and
YouTube,” fall under the purview of the DMCA safe harbors).
36
Steven Halpern, note, New Protections For Internet Service Providers: An Analysis Of “The Online Copyright
Infringement Liability Limitation Act”, 23 Seton Hall Legis. J. 359, 387 (1999); And see 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (a)-(d).
37 Id. at 376.
38
Id. at 378.
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infringers, and must accommodate and not interfere with standard technical procedures for
eliminating copyright infringement.39

These eligibility requirements further reinforce the idea

that ISPs, as “gatekeepers of the Internet,” are uniquely positioned to combat and prevent illegal
online activity. 40
First Safe Harbor
First, an eligible ISP will not be held liable when infringing material is transmitted by a
third party through a “system or network controlled or operated by the service provider.”41
Second Safe Harbor

39

17 U.S.C.A. §§ 512 (i)(1)(A) and (i)(1)(B) provide:
(i) Conditions for eligibility.-(1) Accommodation of technology.--The limitations on liability established by this section shall
apply to a service provider only if the service provider-(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account
holders of the service provider's system or network of, a policy that provides for the
termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the
service provider's system or network who are repeat infringers; and
(B) accommodates and does not interfere with standard technical measures.
40
See supra p. 4.
41
17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (a) provides:
(a) Transitory digital network communications.--A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief,
or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of
copyright by reason of the provider's transmitting, routing, or providing connections for, material through
a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, or by reason of the
intermediate and transient storage of that material in the course of such transmitting, routing, or
providing connections, if-(1) the transmission of the material was initiated by or at the direction of a person other than the
service provider;
(2) the transmission, routing, provision of connections, or storage is carried out through an
automatic technical process without selection of the material by the service provider;
(3) the service provider does not select the recipients of the material except as an automatic
response to the request of another person;
(4) no copy of the material made by the service provider in the course of such intermediate or
transient storage is maintained on the system or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to
anyone other than anticipated recipients, and no such copy is maintained on the system or
network in a manner ordinarily accessible to such anticipated recipients for a longer period than
is reasonably necessary for the transmission, routing, or provision of connections; and
(5) the material is transmitted through the system or network without modification of its
content.
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Second, the ISP will not be held liable in certain instances of system caching, where “acts
of intermediate and temporary storage, [are] carried out through an automatic technical process
for the purpose of making the material available to subscribers who subsequently request it.”42
System caching is the process of retaining unauthorized copies for limited times so that material
may be made available for transmission to a subscriber at the discretion of the service provider.43
Third Safe Harbor
Third, most pertinent to the victims of child pornography, is OCILLA’s limitation on
liability for “information residing on the service provider’s systems or networks at direction of
the users.”

44

Such limitation applies directly to chatrooms, websites, and other forum in which

42

See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (b).
Halpern, supra note 36 at 391.
44
17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (c) comprehensively provides:
(c) Information residing on systems or networks at direction of users.-(1) In general.--A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in
subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of
the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled
or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider-(A)
(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the
material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a
case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.
(2) Designated agent.--The limitations on liability established in this subsection apply to a service
provider only if the service provider has designated an agent to receive notifications of claimed
infringement described in paragraph (3), by making available through its service, including on its
website in a location accessible to the public, and by providing to the Copyright Office,
substantially the following information:
(A) the name, address, phone number, and electronic mail address of the agent.
(B) other contact information which the Register of Copyrights may deem appropriate.
The Register of Copyrights shall maintain a current directory of agents available to the
public for inspection, including through the Internet, and may require payment of a fee
by service providers to cover the costs of maintaining the directory.
43
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users post information; areas of the Internet that often give rise to trading in child pornography. 45
To take advantage of the safe harbor, the ISP must satisfy three criteria.46
First, the ISP must not have actual knowledge of the infringing material or activity
conducted by the Internet user.47 This requirement insulates the ISP from actively policing their

(3) Elements of notification.-(A) To be effective under this subsection, a notification of claimed infringement must be
a written communication provided to the designated agent of a service provider that
includes substantially the following:
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of
the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
(ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if
multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single
notification, a representative list of such works at that site.
(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the
subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to
be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service
provider to locate the material.
(iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact
the complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available,
an electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted.
(v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of
the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright
owner, its agent, or the law.
(vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under
penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of
the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
(B)
(i) Subject to clause (ii), a notification from a copyright owner or from a person
authorized to act on behalf of the copyright owner that fails to comply
substantially with the provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not be considered
under paragraph (1)(A) in determining whether a service provider has actual
knowledge or is aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity
is apparent.
(ii) In a case in which the notification that is provided to the service provider's
designated agent fails to comply substantially with all the provisions of
subparagraph (A) but substantially complies with clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv) of
subparagraph (A), clause (i) of this subparagraph applies only if the service
provider promptly attempts to contact the person making the notification or
takes other reasonable steps to assist in the receipt of notification that
substantially complies with all the provisions of subparagraph (A).
45

See Halpern supra note 36 at 393 (supporting the inference that an eligible ISP will be insulated from copyright
liability in most child pornography cases because of the provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c), and the fact that most
pedophiles participate in the child pornography trade in these type of forums).
46
See e.g. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)(1).
47
17 U.S.C. A. § 512 (c)(1)(A)(i).
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services for infringing material and prevents them from being held strictly liable for the actions
of their users. Actual knowledge is established by the victim filing a takedown notice under the
provisions of the DMCA, which must take the form of a written notice to the service provider.48
Second, the ISP must not have profited from the infringing activity if the service provider
has the ability and right to control the activity.49 In determining whether a service provider has
profited from infringing activity, courts should look to see if the value of services provided
subsisted in “providing access to infringing material.”50

An argument that the ISP has not

profited from the infringing activity is hard to make in today’s online environment, as almost
every model of service contains a profit making mechanism.51
Finally, the ISP must have a reporting mechanism in place, and upon notice of infringing
activity, expeditiously remove access to the infringing activity. 52

Generally, reporting

mechanisms are hosted internally by the ISP, and are easily accessible to the users.53
Fourth Safe Harbor
Lastly, OCILLA provides limitation on liability for ISP is linking or referring users to an
Internet location, which contains infringing material or infringing activity. 54 To qualify for this
provision, such linking must be accomplished by the use of “information location tools,”
including a reference, index, directory, hypertext link, or pointer.55 Under certain circumstances,

48

See infra ps. 14-15.
17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (c)(1)(B).
50
H.R. Rep. No. 105-551. Pt. 2 at 54 (1998).
51
See Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2013/02/26/how-do-free-services-on-the-web-make-money/
(last visited Dec. 2, 2013) (demonstrating the various money making models followed by most ISPs).
52
17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (c)(1)(C).
53
See Google, http://support.google.com/legal/troubleshooter/1114905?hl=en (last visited Dec. 2, 2013)
(demonstrating Google’s current reporting mechanism).
54
17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (d).
55
H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, Pt. 2, at 56 (1998).
49
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ISPs engaging in these activities may avail themselves of OCILLA’s limitations on liability,
including: (1) when the ISP did not have actual knowledge of the infringing activity and (2)
when the ISP takes steps to expeditiously remove the link to the infringing material. 56
Takedown Notice
Under OCILLA, to be viable, the takedown notice must comply with the Act’s
requirements. For instance, the takedown notice must be in writing and delivered to the service
providers designated agent.57 In addition, the notice must substantially comply with six
additional requirements; the absence of one or several in certain circumstances, not necessarily
being fatal to the copyright holder’s infringement claims against the ISP.58 Once the ISP is
provided with actual notice of the infringing material, the ISP is deemed to have actual
knowledge of the infringement, and must notify the alleged third party infringer of the action. 59
The ISP must also take steps to expediently remove or disable access to the infringing material. 60

56
57

Halpern, supra note 36 at 396.
Id.

58

17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (c)(3)(a)(i)-(vi) requires the following:
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive
right that is allegedly infringed.
(ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted
works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a representative list of such works at that
site.
(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity
and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to
permit the service provider to locate the material.
(iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the complaining party,
such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an electronic mail address at which the
complaining party may be contacted.
(v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner
complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.
(vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the
complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly
infringed.
59
17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (g)(2)(A).
60
17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (c)(1)(C).
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Remedies
Injunctive relief is the primary remedy available to copyright holders under the
provisions of OCILLA.61 Courts must consider four enumerated factors when deciding whether
to grant injunctive relief; and upon deciding to grant an injunction, will craft relief that is
consistent with those promulgated by OCILLA.62 For instance, when the service provider is a
passive conduit for the infringing conduct, (1) the court may order the service provider to
terminate the accounts or subscriptions of those who are using the service provider’s system to
engage in infringing activities, (2) or the court may order the service provider to take reasonable
steps to block access to identified and specific locations outside the United States.63 When the
service provider is acting in the capacity of either a system cache, an information location tool,
or a network hosting information at the direction of the user, (1) the court may enjoin the service
provider from providing access to the infringing material, whether the material or activity is
occurring at a particular online site or on the service provider's own network, (2) the court may
order the service provider to terminate accounts or subscriptions it has with the entities engaging
in infringing activities, (3) or the court may issue any injunctive relief that it believes is
necessary to restrain or prevent infringement.64

61

See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (j).

62

17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (j)(2) requires the following considerations:
(A) whether such an injunction, either alone or in combination with other such injunctions issued against
the same service provider under this subsection, would significantly burden either the provider or the
operation of the provider's system or network;
(B) the magnitude of the harm likely to be suffered by the copyright owner in the digital network
environment if steps are not taken to prevent or restrain the infringement;
(C) whether implementation of such an injunction would be technically feasible and effective, and would
not interfere with access to noninfringing material at other online locations; and
(D) whether other less burdensome and comparably effective means of preventing or restraining access
to the infringing material are available.
63
17 U.S.C.A. §§ 512 (j)(1)(B)(1) and (j)(1)(B)(2).
64
17 U.S.C.A. §§§ 512 (j)(1)(A)(i), (j)(1)(A)(ii) and (j)(1)(A)(iii).
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The Application of Copyright Law to Traditional Legal Pornography
It has become increasingly clear that traditional legal pornography is copyrightable. In
1979, the Fifth Circuit held that obscenity was not a defense to copyright infringement of
pornographic materials because nothing in the Copyright Act of 1909 precluded the copyright of
obscene.65 In that seminal case, the Fifth Circuit concluded that holding obscene materials
copyrightable furthered the pro-creativity purposes of the Copyright Act and of congressional
copyright power generally.66
Most courts are willing to accept the idea that legal pornography is afforded copyright
protections.67 Nearly three years later, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit’s position on
the copyright of obscene materials.68 Similarly in 2004, a third court decided to follow Mitchell
Brothers decision.69
The Application of Copyright Law to Child Pornography
At first glance, it is quite clear that child pornography falls outside the protections of
copyright law, as it is “non-progressive” and “non-useful.”70

Undoubtedly, such a conclusion

arises when one considers the ongoing harm inherent in the production and dissemination of
child pornography.71 But if we dig a little deeper, it becomes obvious that an argument can be
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Mitchell Bros. Film Group and Jartech, Inc. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F. 2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979).
See Id.
67
But see Devils Films, Inc. v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d 174, 175-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (the District Court holding
that the pornographic films were “obscene,” and not afforded copyright protections from infringement).
68
See Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F. 2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1982) (remarking that “the leading treatise on copyright
has called the Fifth Circuit’s Mitchell Brothers case ‘the most thoughtful and comprehensive analysis on the issue
‘”[the application of copyright to traditional legal pornography]).
69
Bartow, supra note 2 at 36, citing Nova Products, Inc. v. Kisma Video, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24171, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2004) (describing the Mitchell Brothers decision as “well-reasoned and scholarly”).
70
Bartow, supra note 3.
71
See supra ps. 4-5.
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made that victims of self-produced child pornography may, in certain situations, have a
copyright claim against ISPs.72
Under the tenets of traditional copyright law, victims of self-produced child pornography
are creators as they produce the images or video themselves, and should be able to claim a
copyright interest in the work.73

As copyright holders, victims of self-produced child

pornography have the power to serve a takedown notice to the ISP who is providing access to the
pornographic material.74 This power gives the victim, as copyright holder; leverage to force the
ISP to take action in removing or preventing access to the infringing pornographic material. If
the ISP fails to comply with the takedown notice, the victim can seek injunctive relief through
the courts.
The ongoing case of texxxan.com is instructive in illustrating the potential remedial
power copyright law gives to victims of self-produced child pornography. In this case, the
website specialized in the particularly evil practice of “revenge porn,” where individuals posted
self-produced images of former girlfriends or wives, out of spite.75 The victims, including two
who are underage, brought a class action lawsuit against the website and the ISP seeking
damages.76 Although, the victims did not need to assert a copyright action in this particular case,
as the website was shut down after public outcry, in the future, similarly situated victims can
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It becomes critical at this juncture of the analysis to recall the definition of self-produced child pornography; See
supra p. 3-4.
73
But see supra p. 3 (By definition, victims of traditional child pornography do not have remedies based in
copyright law because they are not considered creators under the law.).
74
See 17 U.S.C.A. § 201
75
Jolt Digest, http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/privacy/unwanted-exposure-civil-and-criminal-liability-forrevenge-porn-hosts-and-posters (last visited Dec. 2, 2013).
76
BetaBeat, http://betabeat.com/2013/02/two-alleged-underage-victims-sign-onto-revenge-porn-lawsuit-againsttexxxan-com-and-godaddy/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2013) (noting that two underage victims have joined the lawsuit
against texxxan.com and GoDaddy).
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assert a copyright action to compel the ISP to take corrective measures and eliminate or block
access to the infringing material.
b. COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT (“CDA,” “ACT,” or “§ 230”)
The safe harbor provision of the CDA represents another Congressional attempt to
regulate the Internet, and perhaps, a potential avenue of recourse against negligent ISPs for
victims of child pornography.77

The impetus for CDA § 230 was provided by a 1995 court

decision, which held an ISP liable for defamation when the ISP exercised editorial control over
content provided by a third party.78

In that case, the defendant, an ISP who hosted an online

message board, was compared to a newspaper editor; in the way it removed obscene material
from board.79 The Court opined that under the CDA, the ISP’s actions were equivalent to those
of a publisher, and therefore, the ISP was liable for the defamatory remarks posted on the
message board.80
Congress, concerned that the Stratton decision would prevent ISPs from policing their
own content, amended the existing CDA by adding § 230. As evidenced by Senator James
Eton’s introduction to the CDA, the Act was established with the dual intent of promoting free
speech on the Internet, while allowing ISPs to self-regulate without fear of liability.81 In light of
these intentions, once passed, § 230 had two effects: (1) it regulated harassment, indecency, and
obscenity online and (2) it determined that operators of online services would not be held liable

77

See 47 U.S.C. § 230.
KrisAnn Norby-Jahner, “Minor” Online Sexual Harassment And The CDA § 230 Defense: New Directions For
Internet Service Provider Liability, 32 Hamline L. Rev. 207 (2009).
79
See Id. citing Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Serv., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, 12-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 25, 1995).
80
Id.
81
Id.
78
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for illegal conduct in the process of self-regulation.82 At controversy, and most relevant to this
paper, is the far-reaching ramifications of the latter effect, which has been interpreted to provide
a virtually per se safe harbor to ISPs.83
The CDA’s safe harbor is established by § 230 (c), which indicates that ISPs will not be
“treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.”84 More specifically, to gain the benefit of the safe harbor, the ISP must satisfy three
criteria. First, the defendant must be a “provider or user” of an “interactive computer service.”85
Second, the Plaintiff’s cause of action must treat the service provider as the “publisher or
speaker” of the harmful information at issue.86

Finally, the harmful information must be

provided by a third party, colloquially known as the “information content provider.”87

Given

the function of the typical ISP, as a passive conduit for the posting and sharing of content online,
most, if not all ISPs, will be able to escape liability under this safe harbor provision.
Several courts have interpreted the CDA’s safe harbor provision as providing complete
immunity to ISPs from liability stemming from cyber tort actions. 88 At the outset, courts were
willing to extend complete immunity in cases of defamation. In Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,

the Fourth Circuit held that § 230 “creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that
would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of

82

Id.
(This answers in the negative, the original question of whether the CDA provides an avenue of civil recourse for
victims of child pornography against the ISPs.).
84
17 U.S.C.A. § 230 (c)(1).
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Id. at (c)(1)(2).
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Id. at (c).
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Id. at (c)(1).
88
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Section_230_of_the_Communications_Decency_Act#Limits (last visited
Dec. 2, 2013)
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the service.”89 In that case, the plaintiff was allegedly defamed by an unidentified user of
America Online’s (“AOL”) bulletin board service, but was unable to bring claims against
the poster because of missing records.90 The Fourth Circuit’s holding, left the ISP
judgment proof, even when the ISP may have had actual knowledge of the tort, and had
the ultimate effect of preempting all state tort law claims against ISPs.91
The Application of § 230 to Child Pornography
Alarmingly, the broad immunity exemplified by the Zeran Court’s decision, has been
extended beyond defamation cases, and has touched the realm of child pornography.92 For the
first time, in 1998, a Court addressed the intersection of child pornography and CDA Section
230.93 The victim, an eleven-year-old boy, was sexually assaulted by the defendant, his
schoolteacher.94 The encounter was videotaped, and the defendant proceeded to discuss the
attack and make arrangements to sell the tape in an AOL chatroom. 95 The victim’s mother sued
AOL for negligence, claiming that AOL knew or should have known, that the defendant and
others like him used the service to market and distribute child pornographic materials, that it
should have used reasonable care in its operation, that it breached its duty, and that the damages
were reasonably foreseeable as a result of AOL's breach.

89

96

Citing § 230, the Court dismissed

129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
Id.
91
See Id. at 331 (Plaintiff is contending that “he provided AOL with sufficient notice of the defamatory statements
appearing on the company’s bulletin board.”).
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Doe v. America Online Inc., 718 So. 2d 385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Doe v. Myspace, 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir.
2008).
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American Online, Inc., 718 So. 2d.
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the case, holding that AOL was not liable because it did not edit or withdraw the posting.97
Similarly, in 2007, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
extended complete immunity in a case arising out of the trading of child pornography in a
Yahoo! hosted e-group, aptly named the Candyman group.98 Here, Plaintiffs, the parents of the
victim, sought to hold Yahoo! civilly liable for profiting from the trade of child pornography.

99

To circumvent the safe harbor provision of the CDA, Plaintiffs argued that Yahoo! had actual
knowledge of the illegal conduct, and did nothing to rectify the situation.100 In upholding
Yahoo!’s motion to dismiss, the District Court emphasized the holding in Zeran, and found that
the CDA’s safe harbor extends to situations where the service provider has actual knowledge of
the illegal activity. 101
These two cases exemplify the problem with § 230 as applied to the issue of child
pornography.

Quite ironically, the CDA, an act that was originally established to protect

children has paradoxically gone the other way, giving ISPs a license to completely ignore the
problem of child pornography on their websites, by preempting all state tort law claims.102
Why § 230 should be Amended
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Id.
2006 WL 3813758
99
Id.
100
Id. at 6.
101
See Id. at 22 (Noting that this case be dismissed with prejudice for the defendants.).
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Devon I. Peterson, Child Pornography on the Internet: The Effect of Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act on Tort Recovery for Victims against Internet Service Providers, 24 Haw. L. Rev. 763, 768 (2002), citing Michelle
J. Kane, Internet Service Provider Liability: Blumenthal v. Drudge, 14 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 483, 501 (1999) (noting
that “while Congress and the court certainly acted admirably in attempting to encourage the development of the
Internet, both erred in excusing [ISPs] from [their] duty under the common law to guard against the damage to
others' reputations. A more cautious approach to regulation on the Internet, and more restraint in interpreting
such regulations, would allow the Internet to develop as a forum of free speech while continuing to offer legal
protection to those who may be damaged by careless citizens of cyberspace.”).
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As highlighted by the three aforementioned cases, the judicially broadened § 230 should
be amended for three primary reasons: 1) the broadened view of § 230 is contrary to the
Legislative history of the Act; 2) the broadened view of § 230 provides no incentive to the ISPs
to police child pornography on their websites; and 3) under the current interpretation of § 230,
victims of child pornography are denied recovery, which cuts deeply against established public
policy concerns.103 I will discuss each reason in turn.
The True Legislative Purpose of § 230
The legislative history of § 230 does not support a broadened interpretation of the safe
harbor provisions.

Although the history is devoid of any specific debate on the issue of

providing complete immunity to ISPs from suits under state tort law for hosting third party
content, there is clear indication that such an interpretation is not justified.104 But what is quite
clear from the legislative history is that the Legislature’s only purpose in establishing § 230 was
to “reverse the preposterous result in Stratton.”105 Thus, the broadened judicial interpretation of
§ 230 is not explicitly or implicitly supported by the legislative history of the Act, and has gone
so far beyond the protections that the Legislature intended to grant to ISPs, that states are now
severely limited in their ability to protect victims of child pornography.106
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Id. at 782, citing Jonathan A. Friedman & Francis M. Buono, Limiting Tort Liability for Online Third-party Content
Under Section 230 of the Communications Act, 52 Fed. Comm. L. J. 647, 652 (2000) (“[C]ritics point to the plain
language and legislative history of section 230 to support the view that Congress enacted section 230 to immunize
[ISPs] only from publisher, not distributor, liability.”).
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Id.
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Id., And see 17 U.S.C.A. § 230 (b) providing that, it is the policy of the United States:

(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and
other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;
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The Need to Incentivize ISPs
Following naturally from the Legislature’s purpose of reversing the Stratton decision,
was a strong desire to remove any disincentive for self-regulation on behalf of the ISPs.107 Yet,
instead of spurring more regulatory action, the Act has created complete immunity from state tort
liability, and ironically, incentivized Service providers to do nothing.108 This paradoxical result
is not wasted on the most skeptical of legal scholars, indeed even some courts seem frustrated
with outcome, referring to the Zeran outcome, the District Court for the District of Columbia
noted that; “it appears to this court that AOL in this case has taken advantage of all the benefits
conferred by Congress in the Communications Decency Act, and then some, without accepting
any of the burdens that Congress intended.”109
Given the ISP’s unique position as gatekeepers to the Internet, it is crucially important to
amend the Act to incentivize self-regulation of content hosted on their websites, including child
pornography.110 Recently, we have seen a shining example of the viability of ISP self-regulation
in the realm of child pornography.111

Pressured by a large upwelling of public outcry in the

(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what information is
received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer
services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking schools who use the Internet
and other interactive computer services;
(5) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that
empower parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and
(6) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity,
stalking, and harassment by means of computer.
Id. at 788.
108
See supra ps. 21-22, (Noting complete inaction on behalf of ISPs to regulate child pornography on their
websites, even when they allegedly have knowledge of the illegal material.).
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United Kingdom, Google and Microsoft, two of the largest ISPs, have integrated technology into
their popular search engines that is designed to prevent over 100,000 search terms that are
calculated to lead to images or videos of child pornography. 112 The establishment of this
screening program represents a stunning U-turn in the position of these two ISPs, who only a
short time ago were arguing that the self-regulation of child pornography shouldn’t be done.113
If the public’s outcry can so effectively incentivize service providers to regulate child
pornography, it seems intuitive that § 230 should be amended to serve this end as well.
The Need to Allow Recovery for Victims of Child Pornography
The most persuasive reason for narrowing the § 230 safe harbor is to allow recovery for
victims of child pornography who have suffered because of the actions or inactions of the ISPs.
As noted earlier, when the Internet is used to distribute obscene and illegal material, the injury to
the victim is real, continual and unending.114

For example, although both child pornography

cases cited in this note were dismissed prior to a jury trial, and thus, we don’t know the full
extent of the evidence, it seems readily apparent that the inaction of both AOL and Yahoo!
played an integral role in the harm.115 If these ISPs were indeed on notice of the illegal material,
their negligence in removing it should be punishable, as they are best positioned to eviscerate the
problem and failure to do so further exacerbates the harm.116 This position of action on behalf of
the ISPs, is further necessitated if we consider the general evasiveness of the modern day
pedophile, and the likelihood that the actual perpetrator is rarely, if ever identifiable to be named
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as a defendant by the victim.117 As it currently stands, § 230 removes any option of redress for
the victim, as it completely insulates the ISPs from liability, even if the ISP has actual knowledge
of the situation. In order to protect children, § 230 needs to be amended, to allow victims of
child pornography a course of redress against negligent ISPs who have actual knowledge of
illegal content and refuse to remove the material.118
PART III. SIMILAR TO COPYRIGHT LAW, § 230 SHOULD BE AMENDED TO HOLD
ISPS LIABLE WHEN THEY HAVE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE THAT ONE OF THEIR
SERVICES IS HOSTING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY.
a. SOLUTION
In searching for a narrowing solution to § 230, it is instructive to juxtapose the Act with
copyright law provisions discussed, supra.119 Fundamentally, OCILLA’s greatest attribute is the
consummate balance it strikes between protecting the interests of the ISPs and the victims of
self-produced child pornography, by promoting the continuing growth of the Internet, while still
imposing self-regulatory action on ISPs.120 The key to facilitating this balance is the actual
knowledge requirement of the provision, which does not trigger the possibility of liability until
the ISP is placed on actual notice of the infringing material.121
An amendment to § 230 that reflects the safe harbor provisions of OCILLA, will
successfully strike a balance between the Legislative policies, which constitute the underpinnings
of § 230, including the policies that call for promotion and continued development of the Internet
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See supra ps. 6-7, (Noting that in today’s age of technology, pedophiles have more resources at their fingertips
to participate in trading child pornography.).
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See 17 U.S.C. A. § 512 (c), (Actual knowledge provision.).
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and the protection of children.122 Accordingly, § 230 should be amended to reflect the actual
knowledge and takedown notice requirements of OCILLA.123
On a practical level, this amendment will work as follows. Similar to the requirements of
OCILLA, ISPs will be required to designate an agent who will receive complaints regarding
illegal content hosted or transmitted on their services.124 Upon receipt of a takedown notice
regarding child pornography, the ISP will have a reasonable amount of time to remove or prevent
access to the content.125 Failure to take action will open the ISP up to state tort liability and
provide the victim with the right to pursue civil damages against the ISP.
b. CONCLUSION
I am not that naïve to believe that an amendment to § 230, which provides virtually
similar provisions to that of OCILLA, will have a major impact on eradicating the circulation of
child pornography. Yet, I think such an amendment will have the desirable effect of narrowing §
230’s safe harbor, and facilitating some form of regulatory action on behalf of the ISPs. The
time has come to hold the gatekeepers to the Internet responsible, when they knowingly ignore
child pornography hosted or transmitted through their services.
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